Abstract: A political geographer reviews the strategy of the international community to incorporate Bosnia-Herzegovina into Western geopolitical structures, placing Bosnia on the road toward possible European Union and NATO membership. The author argues that the strategy is revising the strictures of the Dayton Peace Accords, although it astutely works within the framework of that settlement. The shift from the era of Dayton to the era of Brussels is generating an identity crisis within the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska. Its political class faces a dilemma. In order to preserve their entity, they must turn on its "founding fathers" through proactive cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: I31, O15, O19. 1 figure, 1 
their homes during the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995. Over one million had sought sanctuary abroad, while approximately one million were forced to live in crowded conditions of displacement, as war gave way to stubborn obstructionism to their return (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2005 ). Yet, despite tremendous logistical, legal, and localized geopolitical difficulties, almost half of the displaced were able to repossess their former property and rebuild their houses. Over 447,000 were "minority returns." 4 Therefore, while the consequences of ethnic cleansing have not been fully reversed, the ethnonationalist project of partitioning BiH into separate ethnoterritorial spaces also has not succeeded. Bosnia is reconstructing and recovering aspects of its multiethnic past. 5 These two events and many others represent ongoing processes that are re-making the political geography of BiH. And while they appear to be revitalizing a pre-war multiethnic BiH, these processes are also part of a grand strategy by the international community to move the country beyond its past as a fracture zone between clashing empires, and beyond the Dayton peace that left the country divided into two ethnoterritorial zones with a weak central state (Winchester, 1999) . The goal of this grand strategy is to fully incorporate and embed Bosnia into modern Euro-Atlantic geopolitical space. In the words of European Union High Representative (Foreign Minister designate) Javier Solana, the goal is to move from "the era of Dayton" to "the era of Brussels" (Solana, 2004) . This paper sketches a brief portrait of this strategy and examines its two tracks-the effort to move BiH toward eventual membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. The paper makes two arguments: 6 (1) that the strategy, while ostensibly avoiding any formal revision of Dayton, is actually radically transforming that Accord as it seeks to embed BiH within NATO and EU structures; and (2) that this strategy is producing an existential identity crisis within the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska (RS), as it becomes apparent that the road from Dayton to Brussels runs through the Hague. That crisis is forcing the political class in RS to confront a dilemma: in order to maintain their entity, they must confront the war crimes that established it and accept a diminution of its power.
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
The Dayton Peace Accords concluded in late 1995 were a product of geopolitical failure. At the outset of the wars of Yugoslavian secession, the Western allies developed a 4 "Minority return" is a UNHCR category encompassing those who have returned to entities where they are not the dominant ethnic group. The majority of these are Bosnian Serbs returning to the first of BiH's two entities, the Bosnian Federation (268,410 by October 2004, predominantly to Sarajevo). The second-largest stream of minority returns is that of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Croats returning to their homes in the second BiH entity Republika Srpska (157,551 by October 2004; see Fig. 1 ). For the latest return statistics, see http://www.unhcr.ba/return/ index.htm 5 BiH has not conducted a state census since 1991, when the population was recorded at 4.4 million. Current estimates place the population at 4.2 million-2.8 million in the Federation, which has slightly more territory (51 percent) and many more towns, and 1.4 million in Republika Srpska (RS). This latter figure is contested by one demographer, who argues that RS has experienced significant out-migration and today numbers barely one million inhabitants (ESI, 2004, p. 28) . While the average monthly wage in the Federation is higher than in the RS (534 versus 423 Bosnian marks [BAM] ), its nominal unemployment rate was 45.4 percent (both figures are for September 2004). Due to the prevalence of the informal economy, however, the real unemployment rate is thought to be only half that level. RS does not record unemployment statistics, although it is estimated to be higher than the Federation (EIU, 2005, pp. 14, 27-28) . BiH registered real GDP growth of 3.5 percent in 2003 but aggregate real GDP estimated at only 72 percent of the 1990 level (World Bank, 2004, p. 25) . 6 For alternate expressions of the arguments presented in this paper see Sanguin et al. (2005) and the proceedings of the Globalized Europe conference held in Koper, Slovenia, June 2004. geopolitical division of labor that granted leadership in the search for a solution to the European powers, with the Americans playing a supporting role (Gow, 1997) . This division of labor was beset with problems. European powers deployed troops to Bosnia, but tightly restricted their mandate to non-aggressive peacekeeping efforts (Simms, 2001) . American officials, while prone to criticize European passivity, resolutely refused to send troops. The result was a bankrupt policy of treating the Bosnian war as a localized humanitarian crisis and not a regional strategic challenge to the future expansion of NATO and the European Union (Ó Tuathail, 1999) . It took three years to reverse this damaging policy. Under pragmatic U.S. leadership, the war criminals who initiated the conflict (Milošević and his cronies) and the players who profited from it (Tudjman and his cronies) were brought together with representatives of their chief victims, the Bosnian Muslims, at Dayton, where a very imperfect peace agreement was hammered out (Holbrooke, 1998 ; see also Gow, 2003) . The agreement rewarded ethnic cleansing by recognizing two ethnoterritorial entities, yet recognized the right of the displaced to return to their pre-war homes. It declared Bosnia a unified state, yet granted all the real power to the entities, Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Federation. The Bosnian Federation was further divided into ten cantons (Fig. 1) .
The Dayton Accords saddled BiH with an unwieldy structure of governance, consisting of five levels: the Office of the High Representative (OHR), state, entity, canton (except RS), and opština (county). The result was 13 different constitutions, prime ministers, assemblies, and law making institutions; 760 legislators; 180 ministers; 1,200 prosecutors and judges; and, most importantly, three separate military establishments-all to rule four million people. 7 In sum, the Dayton Peace Accords created a profusion of government offices for political party capture and patronage. The bureaucratic "passive state" that was a historical feature of BiH governance was re-constituted. 8 The EU's role at Dayton was marginalized, and the Americans showed little enthusiasm and support for civilian implementation of the agreement, a task granted to the OHR, an international organization headed by a European Union diplomat (Bildt, 1999) . With the U.S. House of Representatives symbolically voting against deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia before eventually supporting a time-limited deployment, the Clinton administration did not want to be seen involved in a "nation-building" project. Yet, as the situation stabilized over the following two years, Madeline Albright's State Department came to recognize the key role played by the OHR.
From its inception, the OHR was divided; "minimalists" believed that it should rarely interfere in the operation of BiH institutions, whereas "maximalists" advocated that the OHR should exercise all its influence to enforce Dayton implementation in the face of entrenched local opposition and obstructionism. However, by the end of 1997, with no agreement in place on citizenship, passports, a national license plate, or national flag, the dysfunctional nature of the governance structures created at Dayton was apparent to all in the OHR.
In November 1997, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), meeting in Bonn, made two crucial decisions that proved to be the genesis of the current OHR grand strategy. 9 First, the PIC declared that the future security of Bosnia was best guaranteed not by accepting ethnic partition but by putting in place a process that would allow the displaced to cross interentity boundaries and return to their homes, even if these homes nominally were recognized at Dayton as located within the homeland of another ethnic group. This support for "minority returns" over "local integration" within distinct homelands produced a property law implementation process that, gaining momentum, eventually culminated in the one-million-plus returns recorded by 2004.
Second, the PIC gave the OHR expanded "Bonn Powers" to implement Dayton, including: (1) "substitute authority," whereby the OHR could supersede local authority and impose laws and policies that would overcome local obstructionism to certain aspects of Dayton; and (2) "international authority," in which the OHR could exercise powers of removal, suspension, blockage, and fining in order to advance Dayton implementation. 10 The Bonn Powers transformed the power relationship between the OHR and Bosnian politicians at all scales of governance.
In its first decision implementing this expanded mandate, the OHR imposed a law on BiH citizenship in December 1997, in the wake Bosnian politicians' failure to meet a deadline to resolve this matter themselves. The decision gave notice to Bosnian politicians that 7 At the local level were over 160 opštini, each with a mayor and local council. 8 The term "passive state" refers to a permanent public administration bureaucracy characterized by technocratic governance and a lack of democratic accountability. It is a state form that reached its apogee in Bosnia during communist rule (ESI, 2004, pp. 2-7) . 9 The Peace Implementation Council is a group of 55 states and international organizations that are diplomatically involved in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords. It appoints the OHR, sanctions strategic policy, and generally supervises the implementation of Dayton. The major players in the PIC are diplomats from EU states as well as Russia, Japan, and the United States. 10 The exercise of substitute authority, but not international authority, is subject to judicial review by Bosnia's Constitutional Court. the peace process was "entering a new and decisive phase." The heretofore minimalist High Representative, the Spanish diplomat Carlos Westendorp, declared that he had decided to "fully use" his authority to ensure "efficient implementation" of the Dayton Peace Accord (Westendorp, 1997) . Imposed decisions on the flag, the design of bank notes, and a uniform license plate followed, as well as the first removals of local politicians deemed obstructionist.
Westendorp was succeeded by the Austrian diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch in August 1999. With BiH institutions still demonstrably passive and dysfunctional, further imposed decisions and removals followed. An ascendant "maximalist" vision pitted the very institution charged with civilian implementation of Dayton against governance structures sanctioned by it. Superficially, the agenda was the removal of obstacles and blockages to the "efficient implementation" of the Accord through personnel changes and standardized compliant laws. But the problems ran deeper, as maximalists were concerned about the economic future of BiH, a future that required, in their view, a more coherent Bosnian state.
Yet, the international community and the OHR also decided that it was neither politically feasible nor desirable to sponsor an explicit revision of the Dayton Peace Accords (the so-called "Dayton II" option). The issue was a deeply politicized one in Bosnia, and would inevitably be viewed in zero-sum terms. 11 The strategy of the international community rather was to proceed, in piecemeal fashion, to "upgrade" Dayton according to a central organizing principle: the rule of law. This was a non-ethnically identified principle that could be sold to the Bosnian people, weary of a culture of impunity, and a principle that could transform Dayton from within. Institutionalizing the rule of law required the establishment of competent, empowered state-level institutions and the downscaling of entity institutions and powers. To push this agenda, the OHR utilized its expanded powers under Dayton to undermine aspects of the agreement that did not serve its grand strategy, in effect re-imagining the Accord not as an agreement legitimizing ethnoterritoriality but as launching BiH on the road toward European structures and norms. Inevitably, this brought internal contradictions within the Accord to the fore, and caused confrontations between the OHR and the entities, particularly Republika Srpska.
The OHR's grand strategy is based on the premise that Bosnia faces two central challenges: (1) to remove war and violence as an option from its political life; and (2) to undertake a post-socialist transition to a capitalist market society as the basis for future economic prosperity. These goals can be plainly represented by the OHR as "peace and [economic] prosperity." To provide a framework for addressing these challenges, OHR has sought to embed Bosnia within processes and procedures leading toward eventual NATO and European Union membership. The need for initial steps along the path toward these eventual goals has prompted some innovative and creative state building, particularly under the leadership of the current High Representative, Paddy Ashdown.
Ashdown began his tenure by articulating OHR's grand strategy in populist terms. "Bosnia and Herzegovina," he declared, "spends far too much money on its politicians, and far too little on its people" (Ashdown, 2002) . Echoing some of the neoliberal rhetoric used by Margaret Thatcher in 1980s Britain, he argued that "there is no alternative to reform and to setting clear priorities." His priorities were first justice, then jobs and reform. Justice came first "because the rule of law is the starting point-the essential requirement for a decent life for the people of BiH and for progress in everything we do." Jobs came next "because employment is the key to human dignity and to a decent future for our children." Yet reform was equally vital "because we cannot have either justice or jobs if we don't first change the system that has denied both to far too many, for far too long." Dayton, he declared, is "the floor, not the ceiling. It is the foundation for the state we are trying to construct." Ashdown began the systematic use of European comparisons in order to set the agenda for reform: Bosnian foreign direct investment per capita was a pittance compared to Croatia; Bosnian judges were too numerous and inefficient compared to those in Germany; etc. The passive state had to become active. Ashdown's simple message and direct style established strong support for him personally throughout Bosnia.
Central to the operation of OHR's grand strategy of transforming Bosnia into a modern European state was securing the agreement of Bosnia's political class that the only future for Bosnia was in Europe. Rhetorically co-opted as being "for Europe," this mantra was then instrumentalized into a specific agenda of reform represented as necessary for moving along "the road to Europe." As "Europe" was defined by the PIC, the Board of Principals, 12 and the OHR, local politicians were compelled to maneuver on rhetorical ground established by these powerful players and to vie with one another to present themselves as pragmatic and moderate reformers. Since Bosnian institutions remained overly dependent upon international aid transfers, and the poverty reduction and growth facility underwritten by the International Monetary Fund, the OHR had considerable financial leverage, beyond its Bonn Powers, to move the process of reform forward in the desired direction. 13 Key to moving Bosnia towards Europe, as far as the OHR was concerned, was the consolidation of BiH statehood through the creation of centralized, responsive, state-level institutions suported by their own revenue streams. This process was justified by use of a provision in the Dayton Constitution (The General Framework, 1995, Annex 4, Article III, V, a) that allowed a transfer of competencies from the entities to the state. The OHR leveraged this clause to change the balance of power between the entities and the central state, cutting back entity competencies and financial power while increasing those of the state.
THE ROAD TO EUROPE
Bosnia's progress on the "road toward Europe" since 1999 has been driven by the Stabilization and Association process launched in 1999 (see Table 1 ). Through high-profile reports, it has produced agenda items and a benchmark assessment process to enable Bosnia to enter Stabilization and Association talks and eventually conclude an agreement (SAA) on a defined path toward EU membership. The European Council made it clear in 2000 that all countries covered by the Stabilization and Association process, launched in 1999 as part of 12 Since 2002, the international community in BiH has coordinated its activities though a Board of Principals. The group meets once a week in Sarajevo and is chaired by the head of the High Representative. Its permanent members are OHR, the NATO-led military stabilization force (SFOR) [replaced in December 2004 by an EU-led stabilization force (EUFOR)], the Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UNHCR, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), and the European Commission. Representatives of international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also are regular participants.
13 There were material reasons for BiH's orientation toward Europe, although there are significant differences between the Federation and Republika Srpska. In 2003, the main trading partners of the Federation were Croatia (19.9 percent of exports, 19.3 percent of imports), Germany, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Italy. The main trading partners of the less dynamic Republika Srpska were Serbia and Montenegro (41.5 percent of exports, 22.7 percent of imports) and then Italy, Croatia, and Slovenia (EIU, 2005, p. 6) .
the "Stability Pact," were potential candidates for EU membership. 14 That year the EU External Relations commission published an "EU Road Map" that identified 18 essential steps BiH needed to complete before a feasibility study of its potential suitability for EU membership could be undertaken. These 18 steps were deemed "substantially completed" by September 2002 and a Feasibility Study launched soon thereafter. 15 The latter, in turn, identified 16 priority areas where reform was necessary before Bosnia would be in a position to open negotiations for SAA. These included the development of more effective governance, public administration, human rights, judiciary, migration, taxation, and budgeting structures. 16 The Feasibility Study's central evaluation was that the wartime divisions of the country have not yet been overcome. "Dealing with these divisions and securing a functioning state is important in the context of a SAA, as only coherent, functioning states can successfully negotiate an agreement with the EU" (European Commission, 2003, p. 14, emphasis in the original). Significantly, the first priority for action identified by the Feasibility Study was for Republika Srpska to fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague. In short, the road to the EU runs through the Hague. To break the institutional resistance to reform among Bosnia's political class, Ashdown used commissions, consisting of international experts and local officials, and the international evaluation process to advance the agenda of reform. The Commissions on Indirect Tax Reform, Intelligence Reform, Defense Reform, and Police Restructuring built upon earlier reforms of the state court, customs service, and judiciary. This strategy helped de-politicize structural reforms to a degree and set the agenda for legislation. But the process of reform has not been smooth. While many Bosnian politicians are rhetorically committed to "joining Europe," they balk at the details, and resent what they see as an EU/OHR/World Bank/IMF dictate (ICG, 2003) . One example is the political battle over adoption of a singlerate value added tax (VAT), part of the effort to make the country a single economic space, improve the efficiency of tax collection, secure funding for central state institutions, and reduce opportunities for corruption. The political elite "consensus" fostered by international institutions was that BiH should adopt a single VAT rate of 17 percent. The BiH cabinet (the Council of Ministers) introduced legislation to this effect in the lower chamber of the statelevel parliament (the House of Deputies), only to see this plan defeated and a two-tiered rate approved for consideration by Bosnia's upper parliamentary chamber (the House of Peoples). The defeat of the cabinet's plan triggered the resignation of its chairman Adnan Terzic, but this was not accepted by the State presidency. 17 Only after considerable political maneuvering was the two-rate system eventually defeated, and the single-rate system the EU and other international bodies desired approved.
The neoliberalism of the structural reforms demanded by the international community generates opposition across all Bosnian communities. 18 But the broader thrust by international institutions to strengthen central state capacity at the expense of entity-level institutions generates particular suspicion, opposition, and obstructionism from Bosnian Serb politicians. Nowhere is this more evident than in the politics surrounding the second track of the OHR's grand strategy, moving BiH towards participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Securing participation required tackling the sensitive issue of defense reform, which rapidly led to existential questions of identity and security in Republika Srpska.
In May 2003, the OHR evoked its Bonn Powers and particular clauses of the Dayton Peace Accord to establish a Defense Reform Commission. 19 It was charged with drafting the legal measures necessary to create defense structures in Bosnia that would be "consistent with Euro-Atlantic standards, in order to ensure, at a minimum, the credible candidacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for entry into the Partnership for Peace program" (OHR, 2003) . These standards effectively required Bosnia to confront and dismantle entity-level control over military structures. A unified military army needed to be established with clear command and control at the state level.
The Commission's report, issued in September 2003, identified a series of deficiencies in the organization of Bosnia's militaries: lack of state-level command, ambiguity and inconsistency in defense competency law, insufficient democratic oversight, lack of transparency, unjustifiable personnel numbers, and obsolete doctrine and equipment (Defense Reform 17 In a sign of the re-conceptualization of state-level institutions, Paddy Ashdown sometimes refers to the chair of the Council of Ministers as "Prime Minister" rather than "Chairman." Under Dayton, the term Prime Minister was reserved for the head of the entity governments, rather than the state government (ICG, 2003, p. 4) . 18 For a critique of this policy, see Pugh and Cooper (2004) . 19 International members formed a majority in the Commission, which comprised 12 members, including the Ministers of Defense of both entities. Commission, 2003) . On the basis of Article III.5 of the BiH Constitution, which charges the State with responsibility for preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of BiH and specifies that "additional institutions may be established as necessary to carry out such responsibilities," the Commission proposed a new Defense Law that establishes state supremacy over all defense matters on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A clear chain of command from the State Presidency through the State Minister of Defense and onward down to the Chief of the Joint Staff was proposed. So also was a comprehensive downsizing of active forces, reserves, and military property and storage sites. The Law, however, did not establish a single army wearing the same uniform, but allowed the retention of entity army identities.
The new Defense Law faced considerable resistance from Bosnia's various political parties because it threatened vested interests, important political constituencies, and existential identities. Even before the release of the report, the ethnonationalist Bosniak SDA (Stranka Democrakratske Akcije-Party of Democratic Action) party leader and member of the BiH Presidency, Sulejman Tihic, charged that the Law was the result of a deal between the Serbs, Croats and international community to prevent the creation of a unified army (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, September 22, 2003, p. 5) . After the Law was published, Ashdown, a NATO delegation, the PIC Steering Board, and other members of the international community went on a publicity offensive to promote the proposed legislation. In one interview, Ashdown declared: "If you do not want to join NATO, you will not enter the EU either. Europe will not give a positive answer if you say no to NATO." The Italian ambassador declared that without the reforms, "BiH may become a black hole in the region" (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, September 26, 2003, pp. 2-3). This image of Bosnia as a "black hole of the Balkans" appeared frequently as the alternative scenario to the "road to Europe" (e.g., Ashdown, 2004d) .
The Defense Law was debated for months, but after a torturous process of amendments and negotiations, the law was passed and adopted by the Council of Ministers. The law put in place many reforms required for membership in PfP and there was considerable expectation that Bosnia would be invited to join at the NATO summit in Istanbul in the summer of 2004. However, perhaps unforeseen, was the Defense Law's requirement that Bosnia's security institutions be in compliance with their international obligations. This brought to the fore a critical contradiction that had lain dormant since conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accords, namely, that between the nature of Republika Srpska and its obligation to cooperate with the ICTY in The Hague.
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA'S EXISTENTIAL CRISIS
Republika Srpska was an ethnoterritorial ideal most vociferously advocated by the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 20 and its leader Radovan Karadžić. This ideal was then brutally realized on the map through ethnic cleansing and the forced displacement of non-Serbs from the territory controlled by the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) lead by former JNA (Yugoslav National Army) commander General Ratko Mladić. The very nature of the entity was bound up with the visions of its founders and the conditions that brought it into existence. Karadžić stressed that Bosnian Serbs were in a life and death struggle for living space with Muslims and exhorted early supporters to never sell land to Muslims (Karadžić in 1991, cited in Ibrahimagić, 2001 ). Though Serbs constituted only 31.4 percent of Bosnia's population in 1991, Serb nationalists claimed that 64 percent of Bosnian territory actually belonged to them. 21 The functional boundaries of RS were never clear but the reconstituted JNA that became the VRS in 1992 seized over 70 percent of the territory of the state in the first few months of the war. By the end of 1992, the initial ethnic cleansing was over, frontlines had largely stabilized, and the RS became institutionalized behind the frontlines as a closed ethnocratic regime.
An ethnocracy is a regime that facilitates "the expansion, ethnicization and control of contested territory and state by a dominant ethnic nation" (Yiftachel and Ghanem, 2004, p. 649) . The VRS under Mladić was the instrument of the production and expansion of RS territory. SDS-dominated local "crisis committees" and an "Assembly of the Serb people of Bosnia" in Pale 22 led by Karadžić were the instruments of its ethnicization. Through the passage of "abandoned property" laws and other measures, land and assets belonging to nonSerbs driven from their homes was appropriated and re-allocated to displaced Serbs fleeing Bosniak-and Croat-controlled territory. Institutions preserved a façade of legality, but criminal activity and contraband commerce were rife. The conception of space that predominated was an apartheid one. Serb nationalists wanted to separate from "Muslim Bosnia" and join a greater Serbian "homeland." Karadžić, for example, envisioned the building of a separation wall in multiethnic Sarajevo. The regime was "closed" because there were no elections during the war, and no space for non-Serbs in the RS polity. The VRS and SDS predominated.
Recognized and legitimated at Dayton, Republika Srpska was transformed from a closed ethnocracy to a much more open one from 1998 onwards. The transformation was a consequence of international community efforts and that of returnees. The international military force (for its first year known as the Implementation Force [IFOR] and subsequently the Stabilization Force [SFOR]) prevented the inter-entity boundary from becoming a hard border after the Accord, the OHR repealed the wartime property laws, and the return process began to chip away at the apartheid vision of RS. The international community and the Bosnian courts also forced changes in the RS constitution, guaranteeing positions for non-Serbs in RS institutions. Also, the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 and his subsequent transfer to The Hague deprived nationalists in RS of their longstanding political ally in Serbia. Yet while these changes opened political life in RS, they have not fully dismantled its ethnocratic power structures. Republika Srpska today is a polity characterized by modest ethnic diversity and political pluralism, while retaining its exclusivist ethos and separatist sentiments. 23 Since the end of the war, RS authorities have managed to avoid their Dayton obligations to cooperate with the ICTY. By the end of 2004, nine years after Dayton, not a single indicted war criminal wanted in The Hague had been apprehended and arrested by the RS police or army. Given its political history, this is hardly surprising, for it would have required the current rulers of the RS to turn on their very own "founding fathers," acknowledging the 21 This discourse was echoed by Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade. Warren Zimmerman records a meeting with Milošević where he claimed that "Serbs in Bosnia lived on and therefore possessed 64 percent of the territory of the republic. Milošević explained that the Muslims were urban and the Serbs rural, so naturally Serbs occupied-and deserved-much more land. With so much territorial control, 'they would not have to respect any illegal acts' [i.e., the "illegal" declaration of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina]" (Zimmermann, 1996, p. 180) . In interviews with Bosnian Serb nationalists over the last few years, this discourse is still evoked (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, 2005) . 22 Pale is a mountain town outside Sarajevo where the RS Assembly met and its leadership resided throughout the war. The plan was apparently to move to Sarajevo upon its capture, and eventuality that did not materialize. 23 Depending on which population estimate is used, non-Serb returnees represent between 1 in 6 or 1 in 9 persons in Republika Srspka.
"original sin" of its creation 24 and cooperating with an international body most Serbs viewed with suspicion, if not contempt.
The embedding of Bosnian institutions in a process organized around acquiring membership in the EU and PfP, however, has made the RS's avoidance of cooperation with the ICTY more consequential. This has generated a spectacle of "compliance performances" by RS institutions, such as offering material compensation to encourage indictees to voluntarily surrender. In the spring of 2004, the RS army conducted a series of high-profile maneuvers in a purported effort to capture Karadžić. 25 These shows of force yielded no indictees but provoked opposition in the RS from organized war veteran groups.
At the Istanbul summit of June 28, 2004, NATO formally rejected Bosnia's application for membership in PfP because of non-cooperation with the ICTY. NATO's communiqué noted that "systemic changes" are still necessary to develop effective security and law enforcement in the RS. This negative outcome created waves in Bosnia's political life. Politicians in the RS found it increasingly difficult to pose as moderate Euro-oriented reformersthey had to make unpopular choices and deliver results to demonstrate their Western credentials. In July 2004, the OHR used the PfP failure to remove a series of officials across the RS from office for allegedly thwarting cooperation with the Hague and aiding Radovan Karadžić.
The PfP criteria and process created a crisis for the RS, because it forced its political class to make a difficult decision about the geopolitical future of their entity. Was the RS an entity still embedded within a Balkan ethnonationalist imaginary, looking toward nationalists in Belgrade rather than (supposed) post-nationalists in Brussels? Would it continue to look to its past as an exclusivist region, awaiting unity with the Serbian homeland, and, therefore, attempt to persistently defy the international community? Or was RS a potential future "Euro region" embedded within modern Euro-Atlantic institutions? Economic realities, above all, oriented the RS political class toward Europe rather than Belgrade. Economically stagnant, technologically moribund, and socially isolated, their entity was also deeply in debt. 26 Only incorporation into Euro-Atlantic structures could potentially save it from its own failures.
With the prospect of another failure to acquire membership in PfP on the horizon, Ashdown addressed the RS Assembly in August 2004. His message was polite, yet clearly delivered: RS must decide whether it is "European." The RS, he declared, has "utterly failed to abide" by the clause in Dayton mandating cooperation with The Hague Tribunal. "This is not just to flout international law, and to defy the values and principles of the Europe you want to be a part of: it is also to flout, fundamentally, a cardinal principle of Dayton." Issuing a veiled warning, he stated that the real threat to the RS and its competencies lie not in Sarajevo but in Banja Luka, and in their own failure to act (Ashdown, 2004c) . Revelations subsequent to Ashdown's speech cast further doubt on the capacity of the RS to "become 24 A part of the reluctance is the legacy of the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995. In 2004, a much-revised and controversial RS report on the Srebrenica massacre finally admitted VRS culpability for the genocide there. As of early 2005, no legal action has been taken against those named as perpetrators in the report, although RS authorities did transfer 16 cases of documents on the Drina Corp, the division responsible for the Srebrenica killings, to The Hague on December 28, 2004. 25 A colleague and I were caught up in one such exercise in the Srebrenica area in March 2004. In one instance, a man was killed by RS Special Forces during a search of a Pale monastery for Karadžić. 26 It can be argued that defending RS was all about defending the bureaucratic infrastructure associated with entity governance structures (the "passive state," the source of the relative prosperity of Banja Luka in the RS). RS has never been fiscally solvent and has always required subsidies (initially from Belgrade but in the late 1990s from the West). It currently has an internal debt of 915 million BAM. In BiH as a whole, over 50 percent of gross national income reportedly is spent on administration (OHR BiH Media Round-Up, February 4, 2005, p. 8) . A fiscal crisis seems inevitable. The PIC (2005) has declared that it may be impossible for Bosnian authorities to meet all their obligations for civil servant salaries by the end of 2005.
European," when it emerged that Ratko Mladić, the former VRS commander, was still on the entity payroll as late as 2002 and, furthermore, was reportedly sheltered in a military facility at Han Pijesak in summer 2004. In December 2004, the OHR declared that "the very instruments that are supposed to catch war criminals are sheltering them" (OHR, 2004) .
In December 2004, Ashdown used a second NATO council rejection of Bosnia's application to join PfP to put further pressure on the political class in Republika Srpska. He dismissed nine officials in Republika Srpska for aiding war criminal networks and altered the entity and state Criminal Code to require non-immediate relatives of accused war criminals to cooperate with police investigations. The most consequential of his decisions was acceleration of the process of abolishing the ministries of Defense and Interior at the entity level, a significant transfer of power from the entities to the proposed new state-level institutions. 27 At the same press conference, the U.S. Ambassador announced travel restrictions on the leadership of the two coalition parties in the RS government, the PDP (Party for Democratic Progress) and the SDS, which made them ineligible to enter the United States. He also announced a freezing of SDS assets in the United States and prohibited U.S. residents from financial transactions with that party. The rationale was to "hold appropriate individuals and organizations in the Republika Srpska accountable for their actions" (OPA, 2004) .
These decisions generated a storm of protest in Republika Srpska. RS Prime Minister Dragan Mikerevic, a leading PDP politician, resigned in protest against the "threats and demands" of the OHR. "The OHR," he said, "unfortunately, needs no partners, only executors" (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 18, 2004, pp. 1, 4) . Mladen Ivanić, leader of the PDP whose post as BiH Foreign Minister was compromised given the ban on entry into the United States, also tendered his resignation as did other PDP officials serving in statelevel institutions. 28 Ivanić declared that his party "had done everything for BiH's association with the EU, but we cannot imagine BiH in the EU without RS" (OHR, BiH Media RoundUp, December 19, 2004, p. 2) . 29 RS President Dragan Čavić, a leading SDS figure, declared 27 The Defense Commission had recommended the eventual absorption of entity-level Ministries of Defense into a single state-level Ministry. Ashdown's decision declared that this process should be completed by autumn 2005. The abolition of entity-level Ministries of Interior was one recommendation emerging from the Police Restructuring Commission, which had just released its provisional report. Ashdown declared that a single police system should be adopted early in 2005. At the end of January 2005, he recommended the territorial reorganization of the police force into nine regions and the city of Sarajevo based on "operational efficiency." The regions do not coincide with inter-entity boundaries and thus require the abolition of entity-organized police structures (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up February 1, 2005, p. 2) . The proposal was criticized by nearly all BiH politicians.
28 There was some confusion as to whether the travel ban applied to PDP leader Ivanić. While the U.S. announcement banned "the leadership" of the SDS and PDP, U.S. Ambassador McElhaney would not state the names of the officials not allowed into the U.S. The State Department later informed the BiH Embassy in Washington that Ivanić was not on the list of banned persons (see OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 20, 2004, p. 7) . Either the sanctions had not been prepared with sufficient foresight, or U.S. officials were backtracking in the face of the backlash against their actions. U.S. policy on war crimes issues, in general, has its tensions. On the one hand, the United States is a strong supporter of ICTY conditionality in Bosnia. It also termed events in Darfur Sudan a "genocide." On the other hand, the Bush administration has undermined the work of the ICTY by cutting funding and imposing a termination deadline. It is hostile to the new International Criminal Court in The Hague, yet has called for the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes in Darfur (see Power, 2005) .
29 PDP politicians, after announcing their resignation from state-level institutions, later attended the BiH Council of Ministers meetings, fermenting crisis while serving as "ministers in resignation." Somewhat disingenuously, SDS office holders, including president Borislav Paravac, stated that their sealed resignation letters were at SDS party headquarters and that they would respect the decision of the party on the matter of resignations (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 19, 2004, p. 4) . None resigned. Retaining power and the perks of office was certainly a motivation, as was fear of new elections (the popularity of both parties was slipping while that of former RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats [SNSD] was rising). Another factor, more speculative than probable, is that the OHR might have considered mass resignations to be further Dayton obstructionism, and used them as a pretext for abolishing the RS entirely. that Ashdown's agenda was to abolish Republika Srpska, but that he personally would be "an obstacle to all those who wanted to bring BiH into Europe by imposing violent measures" (ibid., December 18, 2004, p. 2) . Revealing an enduring apartheid vision of Bosnian space, he called for "national unity" in the RS (by which he meant Serbs only) and warned that Ashdown's decision could cause the "homogenization of peoples with possibly severe consequences," such as a return to 1992 (ibid., December 19, 2004, p. 3) . 30 The RS, for Čavić, was a result of a "four-year fight of the Serb people" and "not a gift of the international community." In addition, veterans groups spoke of a conspiracy against the RS by international forces (ibid., December 20, 2004, pp. 2 and 6) . 31 However, not all Bosnian Serbs sought to portray Ashdown's actions, rather than RS inaction, as the source of the crisis. One Bosnian Serb opinion editorial decried RS politicians "who still avoid responsibility and try to deceive the public with their alleged protection of RS and its vital interests" (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 23, 2004, p. 6) . 32 Furthermore, not all of the criticism of the OHR emanated from Bosnian Serb nationalists. The Russian Foreign Ministry declared that membership in an international organization must not be the motive for the erosion of Dayton (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 23, 2004, p. 5) . The influential Berlin-based NGO, the European Stability Initiative (ESI), already had argued that the OHR's role is anachronistic and anti-democratic, and that it inhibits the necessary development of a political culture of local decision making and pragmatic compromise (ESI, 2004) . Their president, Gerald Knaus, declared that "the imposition of constitutional changes by an order is a Draconian measure," and that BiH was becoming a protectorate (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 21-22, 2004, p. 6) . 33 By contrast, Bosniak political leaders have criticized Ashdown for doing too little, expressing doubts that the announced measures would lead to the fulfillment of Republika Srpska's obligations to the ICTY by the next NATO summit (ibid., December 17, 2004, pp. 6-7) . 30 Thinking in ethnocratic terms, Čavić invited RS parties to a meeting intended to form a "government of national unity" to postpone implementation of the OHR's decisions as long as possible. Publicly reminded that not all RS parties were Serb or agreed with this goal, and that the RS constitutional structure prohibited a government of one ethnicity alone (five Bosniaks and three Croats must be ministers in any RS government), he hastily met with non-Serb RS parties before his scheduled meeting with RS Serb parties. He denied that his "national unity" meeting was a "confidential Serb conspiracy," but merely a meeting of "the strongest" parties in the RS. The constitutionally mandated Bosniak Vice President of the RS reminded him that the RS "cannot be the entity of one people only" (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 19, 2004, p. 4; December 20, p. 5; and December 21, 2004, pp. 3-4) . On December 22, Čavić's initiative produced an "agreement on coordinated political action" among the six leading Bosnian Serb parties that strongly denounced imposed changes to the constitutions of the RS and BiH. 31 In anticipation of sanctions, a coordinating board of 11 RS NGOs had called on the RS government to resign and for Serb state-level representatives to withdraw from their positions (OHR, BiH Media Round-Up, December 15, 2004, p. 3) . The RS Veterans Association began collecting signatures for the removal of Ashdown. It urged that the OHR be sued for the "non-constitutional" imposition of solutions in police and defense reform (ibid., December 16, 2004, p. 4; December 20, 2004, p. 6) . The RS Union of Refugees and Displaced Persons (Serb only) promoted a referendum on RS independence from BiH (ibid., February 5, 2004, p. 7) . 32 It is worth emphasizing that Bosnian Serb opinion is not homogeneous. Anti-nationalist organizations, like the RS Helsinki Committee, exist. The discourse of nationalism encourages the facile use of collective nouns in political narratives, but ethnic groups and nations never act collectively and should not be essentialized. 
W(H)ITHER REPUBLIKA SRPSKA?
In June 2004, a colleague and I interviewed former RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, whose SNSD party had won the largest share of votes in the October 2004 municipal elections in Republika Srpska. 34 When asked if he believed that the RS could transcend the "original sin" of its founding, he answered affirmatively, if "all of those associated with the war" were removed. While clearly referring to those on The Hague's indictment list, Dodik was perhaps asking for the impossible. The desire to create an exclusivist ethnonationalist space for the Serbs of Bosnia was one of the principal causes of the war in BosniaHerzegovina. The RS was a secessionist ethnocratic entity, proclaimed by extreme nationalists and actualized through an extraordinary campaign of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape, pillage, destruction, and forced displacement. It was not a "top-down" product of elites alone. 35 These acts were carried out by hundreds of ordinary citizens as well police, politicians, and soldiers. The legitimation of RS in the Dayton Peace Accords was in direct contradiction to provisions committing Bosnia to modern, liberal European values. 36 Initially opposed to Dayton, the RS leadership beginning with Biljana Plavšić, a leading nationalist who broke with the Pale-centric SDS and formed her own political party, came to realize that Dayton was actually not a bad deal at all for the Bosnian Serbs (Cigar, 2001, p. 232) . Dodik was able to take advantage of the Karadžić-Plavšić split to move the RS in a more moderate direction in 1998. Subsequent splits within the SDS created the current fractured Bosnian Serb political landscape and the rise of politicians who talked the language of moderation and reform to the international community while periodically stoking exclusivist dreams with their own political constituents.
In some ways the forked-tongue practices of RS politicians are not that different from many other European politicians, particularly in enlargement countries, who periodically have to reassure domestic interests and shore up their credentials with nationalist discourse (Kuus, 2002) . However, no other European region has as murderous a recent history as Republika Srpska, a territory where mass graves are still being discovered and excavated every summer. No other regional authority has so systematically resisted cooperation with the ICTY and failed to arrest alleged war criminals in its midst (even Serbia and Croatia have cooperated, albeit reluctantly). The RS political class realizes that it must cooperate with the ICTY to progress along the road to Europe. The longer it refuses to cooperate, the more it places its status (and continued international aid) in question. With entity institutions being downsized or facing abolition, it can be argued that the grand strategy of the OHR is working as intended. Deliberately choosing not to revise Dayton in an explicit way, it has put in place a process that is nevertheless doing just that through the establishment of European criteria, standards, and goals. This process is transparent to the public and appears to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 37 Yet it is characterized by perpetual political instability and the anti-democratic imposition of laws and sanctions by the OHR. The paradox of state-building, as Ashdown himself has noted, is that in order to "get out" of Bosnia sooner, the OHR has had to deepen its involvement in the reform and institution-building process (Ashdown, 2004b) . The paradox facing the political class running RS is that they must repudiate their entity's "founding fathers" and relinquish some power in order to retain it.
CONCLUSION
The year 2005 will be critical for the OHR's strategy. A NATO Council meeting in April and possible Stabilization and Association talks are on the horizon. So also is the completion of Paddy Ashdown's tenure as High Representative, the possible end of the Bonn Powers, and the transformation of the OHR into a much weaker European Union office. 38 The decision on the final status of Kosovo will have ripple effects in Bosnia as well, potentially strengthening Bosnian Serb influence if, as expected, the international community declares Kosovo to be independent, and thus has to mollify Serb opinion demanding "compensation" in Bosnia. RS politicians have demonstrated their ability to plunge Bosnia into crisis by withdrawing from state-level institutions: a BiH in NATO and the EU must contain RS as far as they are concerned. Yet OHR and U.S. sanctions have reinforced the message that the road from Dayton to Brussels runs through the Hague. Bosnia must be a "coherent state" if it is to enter NATO and the European Union. Can these conflictual logics be reconciled? That question is at the heart of political dynamics in BiH at the moment. In a small sign of movement, authorities in the RS for the first time transferred an ICTY indictee to The Hague in January 2005. But its "founding fathers" remain at large, evading the geopolitical world their entity aspires to join in order to survive economically.
